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Introduction
The profound transformation of the Itali an p arty system in the early
1990s has posed an interestingly new puzzle in regard to the emergence
of new and the rejuvenated right wing parties in the contemporary Italian
political landscape. It is interesting and puzzling for several reasons.
First, not only have they gained an electoral success but they also have
become major parties and have endured over time. Second, as said by
Pappas, most political scientists have felt that politics in Southern Europe
is more about the left than the right. And there had been a "norm" that
democrats on the right abandoned "far-right positions and move toward
the center-left of the continuum." (2001:225). The emergence of the right
wing parties in Italy therefore seems to challenge the norm. Third, there
has been a widespread movement of the "new left parties" across the
European continent (Dalton and Kuechle\ 7991.; Kitschelt, 1997); and it
only puts the strengthening Italian right wing parties at odds.
The Italian right wing parties consist of four major parties that
represent two new parties (Lega Nord and Forza ltalia) and two rejuvenated
old parties (Centro Cristiano Democratico and Alleanza Nazionale). Lega
Nord was established in the mid 1980s and has remained visible in the
Italian electoral politics ever since. It initially only gained a very small
fraction of the vote in the 7987 national election but then substantially
increased its electoral achievements in the next two elections (8.9 and 8.4
%) before it stumbled in the 2001 election at nearly 3.9 % share of the vote.
Forza Italia began to participate in the 7994 election and since then has
become the dominant parfy of the right. In the last election of 2007,Forza
Italia recorded an irnpressive win by securing 29.5 % of the total vote.
The other right wing parties (the rejuvenated MSI or Alleanza Nazionale
and the smaller parties altogether) have also made a better electoral
performance as shown by their increasing shares of the vote. The only
exception is CCD, the party that has replaced the ideological position of
the defunct Democrazia Cristiana. It secured only an electorally modest
record: 5.8 % in 7996 and 3.2 % in 2001. More importantly, with Forza
Italia as the central player in the electoral and governmental coalitions,
the Italian politics has now moved to the right direction.
How do we explain the right wing parties'electcral success? Is the
success merely a reflection of "protest voting"? If this is the case, what
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explains the endurance of the right wing parties? \alhy are the right wing
parties, not the left?
To answer these questions, I will develop a structural argument
that explores the social base(s) of the right wing parties. This is my
contention that the emergence and, in particular, the durability of the
right wing parties in Italy can better be explained by lookilg at the socral
base of the-parties of the right. Their social base is rooted in the north-
south socialileavage that has formed through a long period of time in the
Italian history. Yet this cleavage remained dormant during the period of
the First Republic. Since the late 1980s, however, Italian politicians have
begun to aclivate this cleavage and skillfully exploited the issue of north-
ro.rth division. It is worth noting here that my argument is not intended
to prove that other types of explanations are wrong. Other explanations
that rely on a cultural or institutional approach could be true. But, in my
opiniory they are incomplete. In briel the argument developed in this
paper serves a purpose as a complement to the existing explanations.
Literature Review
For the last decade, many scholars have discussed the
transformation of the Italian party system and the phenomenon of the
new Italian right on various aspects. Some of them are well documented
in Parties, Politics, and Democracy in the Southern Europe (Diamandorous
and Gunther [eds.], 2001).
Gunther & Montero and Sani & Segatti, among others, write articles
that primarily deal with the stabilify and the collapse of the Italian First
Republic's party system. On the stability of the party system Gunther and
Montero show how the parfy system was well-anchored in the society
where stable partisanship underpinned the existence of major parties
such as Partito Comunista Italiano (PCI), Partito Socialista Italiano (PSI),
and Democrazia Cristiana (DC). Thuy argue that the extent of cleavage
encapsulation served as a source of partisan competition. This is to say
that cleavages and the party system that were built on it corresPondingly
helped to determine partisan preferences of citizens. At the same time,
existence of secondary organizations would also affect translation of
objective mass-level cleavages into actual supports for political parties (P.
e6).
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Furthermore, Gunther and Montero identify the process of how
religion and class cleavages were translated into political oppositions
(i.e. political parties) during the period of the First Republic. On the left,
the working class 
- 
politically alienated for a considerable of time in the
late of the 19th century 
- 
organized themselves against the Catholics on
the right. With the help of the labor and trade unions, the left organized
and channeled their political support for PSI. On the opposite side, the
Catholics mobilized themselves in order to dominate the Italian political
scene and channeled their supports behind DC. The point is that the
cleavage encapsulation could capture the dynamics of political supports
during the First Republic. Th"y had produced a stable political alignment
or stable partisanships as demons-trated, among others, by the persistent
dominatibn of DC for nearly 50 years - with an interlude when PSI joined
a coalitional government. In1994, however, this party system collapsed.
Since then the new party system has replaced the old one where new
wing parties have emerged and the old parties have changed themselves
to new images. lAlhat explains the collapse?
Gunther and Montero have their answer, but we will see Sani and
Segatti's argument first. Sani and Segatti look at a cultural factor that they
believe was responsible to the collapse of party system. They find that
Italian political culture is unique. They in general have maintained a mixed
feeling toward political parties. Thuy complained about the situation
of fragmented parfy system but continued to support political parties.
\A/hile accusing political parties of creating artificial political conflicts,
they wanted protection from the parties for their groups (2001: 157). This
mixed feeling led to a growing political dissatisfaction among the Italians.
And this eventually led to the build-up of antiparty sentiment..
What was unique to Italy in comparison to other European
democratic countries is that political dissatisfaction among citizens came
earlier and grew faster. Citing one survey by Eurobaromater, Sani and
Segatti show that in 7973ltalians who satisfied with the way demooacy
works were 27 % and this figure decreased to 12 %by 1993:In contrast,
the European average was about 41 o/o in 1973 and increased to 43 "/o in
7993. The manifestation of the dissatisfaction that was expressed in the
form of antiparty feeling, Sani and Segatti believe, was a legary of the
Fascist regime. The Fascist ideology dictated that loyal to the nation
means loyal toward the Fascist party. In other words, citizens' loyalty
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was not understood "in pluralist sense of loyalty to a party"' (162)' This
brought about profound impacts to the Italian citizens as well as to the
development ofpohtical parties during the formation of the First Republic.
To the citizens, ih" fur.ist ideology left in the minds of Italians a high
degree of political distrust toward political parties; to parties, it hindered
parties' organizational development.
Following Sani and Segatti's argumen! we can say that the cultural
factor can partly ixplain the .Jlupt" of the Italian party system. Due to the
growing disuiirfu.tio.t with the performance of democratic institutions
[i.e. pol"itical parties), the collapse of the party system basically was a
matter of tim6. Widely 
"*por"d corruptions 
and political scandals that
involved lead.ers of pst u.,a pc the early 1990s served as a trigger for
the collapse of the First Republic's party system and marked the dawn
of a new party system. ThLs, it can be said that the emergence of the
right wing parii"r is explained at the system level - external to the parties.
Statea differently, theloverlook the internal dynamics of the new parties
as well as the ielationship between parties and their supporters. Sani
and Segatti's argument dehnitely does not touch the question of the new
parties' durability.
Leonardo Morlino (2001) also develops an argument similar to
sani and segatti's in regard to the emergence of the right wing parties
in Italy. Settlng aside hir d"tuiled description on the phases of party
orgunitutionallevelopment, he explains that the new parties were formed
to"seize political opportunities that were available in the early 1990s- As
the old party system disintegrated, politicians were eager to fill the empty
politicaitpu." bnthe center-rightof thepolitical continuum formerly sealed
Ly Dem oZrazia Cristiana. tn the case of Lega Nord, Morlino says that it
nitea "the space left vacant by catholic culture following secularization in
[Veneto, Lombardy, and Piedmont)." (127). It is also true for Forza Italia-
A television magnate, Silvio Berlusconi, established this new Parfy as he
saw the available political opportunity at the time when the center-right
party was disintegiating (128). While this argument is structural in nature,
it rtiit does not teil us where the supports for the right wing parties come
from.
' Gunther and Montero (2001) - as previously discussed - provide
us a theory of political partisanship that deals with the source of political
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supports for political parties in Southern Europe - including Italy. Th"y
convincingly argue that the cleavage encapsulation and well anchored
partisanship were responsible to the stability of the Italian party system
during the First Republic. Yet this argument cannot be carried too far for
explaining the collapse of the parfy system and the emergence of the new
rigfrt wing parties. The theory of partisanship is more for explaining the
stability of support for parties and party system. As Gunther and Montero
themselves indicate, explanation for the transformation of the Italian
party system, among other factors, should be sought at the cleavage
ievel. The weakening social-structuration and the eroding religious
cleavage, in their view, are partly responsible to the diminishing old-type
of pariisanship (see pp. 140-41). In this way, partisanship is treated as
the dependent variable. Yet Gunther and Montero do not fully Pursue
other types of cleavages that eventually become active or activated by the
politicians of the right in ltaly. Neither do they conclusively claim that in
itaty the cleavages have at all been disappearing. Gunther and Montero's
point on the need of connecting cleavages and political parties, however,
is instructive.
On this issue, Lipset and Rokkan (1967) provide us a cleavage
theory thathas nowbecome classic. The core of their argument says that the
existence of cleavages will determine the patterns of political oppositions
or constellation of political parties. But Lipset and Rokkan (1967) prudently
insist, "cleavages do not translate themselves into party oppositions as a
matter of course." (p. 112). Lipset and Rokkan do mention factors that
affect the possibility of cleavage translation into party opposition: the
costs and payoffs of mergers, alliances, and coalitions (p. 777). Yet tlrey
never claim with certainty whether these factors 
- 
including the electoral
strategy 
- 
really shape the last product of translation. At this point, Sartori
enters the discussion stating that in many cases "some cleavages are not
translated at all." (1976:776). He does not buy what he calls the old-style
sociology argument that "[takes] for granted that cleavages are reflected
in and not produced by political system." (ibid). Instead, he underlines
the crucial role of translator in the process of handling or mishandling the
translation.
Przeworski and Sprague (1986) propose a more forceful argument
regarding the role of translators in the process of cleavage translation.
Th"y state that it is politicians or party activists who make the decision
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whether they will activate a dormant cleavage and then Pursue a strategy
that can galvanize political support from the activated cleavage. \A/hen
the politicians feel relatively sure that by activating a particular cleavage
they could obtain an electoral advantage, they will activate_it. A strategy
of campaign is then crafted to appeal voters belong to that cleavage.
Otherwise, they will drop the decision to activate the dormant cleavage
and then pursue another strategy (see, pp. 55-56).
Lipset & Rokkan and Przeworski & Sprague theories basically
suggest us to simultaneously pay attention to cleavages and political
u.ioir. Existing cleavages can be a potential source of relatively stable
support for political parties. But it is only possible when politicians
deiiberately activate the cleavages. Differently put, the cleavages can
become roiiul bases of political parties. Otherwise, the particular existing
cleavages for whatever reason are not activated or suPPressed and they
failed io translate into a political party. In the following section we shall
see that the Italian right wing parties essentially stand on the region-
based cleavages that began to form in the second half of the 19th century.
These cleavages remained inactive since the Giolliti and Mussolini eras,
and during the period of the First Republic. Activated in the late of 1980s,
to a large 
-extent, 
the region-based cleavage can explain why the Italian
right wing parties seem to endure over time.
The North-South Cleavages
It is well known that politics in Italy is marked by the presence of
multiple social cleavages: class, religion, and Left/Right cleavages all exist
(see Gunther and Montero 2001: 96-777).In comparison, the intensity of
cleavage-derived political conflicts and the multiplicity of cleavages may
be lower than of Spain. In terms of their political significance, however,
in both countries, the politics of cleavages is equally important. As
happened in Spairu the social cleavages in Italy emerged as by-product of
nulib.t-state building process. This means that the cleavages have formed
through history.
The history of religious cleavage, for example, according to Gunther
and Montero can be traced back in the period of Risorgimento "when two
subcullures 
- 
orre-rossa and the other bianca - emerged as by-product of
the founding of the Italian nation-state." (2001: 737). The process of state
building itself touched the political and economic interests of the Catholic
743
lurnal llmu Sosial dan IImu Politik, VoL 77, No. 7, luli 2007
Church where in certain regions the state allowed the confiscation of land
belonged to the Church. The conflict befween the state and the Church
culminated when the Church accordingly issued the non-expedit 
- 
a
poliry that urged the Catholics to stay away from politics. This policy
was definitely a direct attack on the legitimacy of the new state. Since
then, the State-Church tension has colored the Italian politics. A degree
of political reconciliation took place during the Mussolini's era when
the Catholic Church endorsed Mussolini's power. The Church's political
trace could also be found during the First Republic era where the Church
established links with the then governing party of Demo crazia Cristiana
through various institutions such as Catholic Actiory Confindustria, and
Coltivattore Diretti (Gunther and Montero 2001: 139; see also, Duggan
7994:187).
To make the Italian politics more complicated, class cleavage also
came into being very early in the political history of ltaly. As documented
by Duggan, workers' cooperatives had begun to flourish in the 1890s and
they became radicalized later on 
- 
in which Michael Bakunin, a Russian
anarchist, played a significant role (Duggan 7994: 763). Transformismo
- 
power altemation carried out by the Italian elite on the left and on the
right 
- 
reflected the actual and potential political impacts of the class
cleavage. This basically was a political way out crafted by the Italian elite
at that time to prevent the working class (i.e. the socialists) from power
(Cotta 1992: 1 50- 1 53; see also, LaPalomb ar a 7987 : 72-13) . The establishment
of Partito Socialista Italiano (PSI) in 1892 was not a coincident that it
saturated political partisanship of the left. Since the universal suffrage was
introduced to the whole population of Italy in7979, PSI has become one
of the major players in Iialian politics. It ii true that during the Fascism
era of Mussolini, parties did not have an opportunity to mobilize political
support for election. Through the Fascism era, however, it displayed
continuity in the composition of elite and mobilization patterns (Puhle
2001:274). Later on, PSI resurfaced as a historic party and competed for
power immediately after the First Republic was founded in 1948.
In addition, the Left and Right cleavages have also crowded the
Italian contemporary politics. Following the data collected by Gunther
and Montero, the Italian citizens are divided into two camps in terms of
placement of self in the continuum of Left and Right. Even though not
as sharp as in Greece, more Italians place themselves either in the Left
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or on the Right than in the Center (Gunther and Montero 2001: 104). It is
possible to seek how these cleavages have formed through history - if we
loosely define what we mean by Left and Right. However, for the purpose
of searching the social base(s) of the new right wing parties in Italy we
need to explore the long neglected cleavages of the North and South.
How have they formed?
The existence of North-South cleavages is reflected in the
contemporary Italian political lexicon as the Northern question (Allum
2000; Sassoon 1997). The Northern question consists of several strands
of related issues attributable to the Northern regions'interest. Bull and
Gilbert, after studying the Lega Nord, come with an understanding
that the Northern question "coincide[s] with the interests and needs of
a model of development based on small- and medium-sized firms and
clamouring for regional autonomy and fiscal federalism." (2001: 767).
More specifically, this refers to the North-East regions such as Lomb atdy,
Veneto, and Emilia-Rogmana. Furtherrnore, the Northern question
touches a political issue where the northerners - as reported by Corriere
della Serra 
- 
complain about political underepresentation in the cabinet
and other govemmental posts "for an area which accounted for a ninth
of the population, an eight of all capital firms, a seventh of the national
wealth ..." (2007: 167-68).
In a wider context, the Northern question embraces other northern
regions that include industrial centers such as Milan, Turin" and Genoa
in the northwest ltaly's (event it emerged earlier in these areas). During
the economic boom of the 1980s, there was a general opinion among the
northerners that the state itself was seen as the obstacle to the northem
economic growth. At the same time they believed that the government
inclined to favor the South (Allum, 2000: 39). Most of the economic
resources that were drawn from the North 
- 
and then channeled to the
South 
- 
was seen as a waste for it did not reduce unemployment rate
during that period. Neither did it produce a self-generating economic
growth in the South (ibid).
The Northern question gained a new relevance when scandalous
events committed by the government officials broke out and hit the media
headlines in the 1980s. The Northern question took form as a direct assault
towards the central government in Rome of being conupt and distrusted
- 
in addition to the accusation of being incompetent and too excessively
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centralized (see Sani and Segatti 2001: 168). In short, the dividing line
between North and South has gotten clearer since the late 1980s.
It should be clear by now that the North-South cleavages do
exist in ltaly. A further investigation on the history of this cleavage will
strengthen this account. Duggan , f or example, identifies the North-South
political gap that emerged very early in Italy. During the process of Italy's
unification, the liberals of the North and South had different conceptions
about what the Italian state should be:
"[Thg Ngrthem] ogtlook was shaped by vigour of the civil society into which
they had been bom; a society of entieprEneurial landowners ... For them it
seeined natural that state should act merely to facilitate and safeguard the
activities of the industrious, such as Britain.-In the Souttu by contrist, where
most landowners were absentee, infrastructure lacking, and the rule of law
weak, liberalism was conceived of in rather different teims ... liberalism had
no meaning here, it was often felt, unless it was 'built' through strong state
action ... " (779)
These different visions seem more political. Yet the political
differences are attributed to the regions. In additiory the visions are linked
to the economic and social feafures of each region. The North was more
industrial, marked by enhepreneurial spirit and strong civil society. The
South was just the opposite. The North-South economic gap was evident
as shown in the following table:
r46
onal Variations (1861)
Notes: "lire/hectare.
Source: Duggan, 7994: 152 (adaptation).
Parma/ Modena
Papal States
Kingdom of Two Sicilies
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As can be seen in the table, "provinces" that constitute the northern
region such as Piedmont, Lombardy, and Veneto in the 1860s were
more developed than the provinces located in the South. The economic
achievements of the North were higher both in terms of agricultural and
industrial products (cotton spindles). This uneven development that led
to econo*ic gap between North and South was even strengthened for
the period of Giolitti's administration (1901-1914). New industries were
planted in Turin and other cities in the northern areas. Engineering
and chemical industries led the growth of ltaly's economy at that time,
including Fia! Alfa, and Lancia (see Duggan 1994: pp.772-3).
Under Fascism (1922-1943), industries "continued to Progress
along the lines laid down during Giolitti an period, with particular growth
in ttre chemical, electrical and machine sectors." (Duggan, 7994: 219)' It
even became at that time the world's largest exporter of artificial fiber-
Even though the growth of car industry was held back due to the limited
domestic market, machine manufacturing flourished together with other
industrial products 
- 
especially chemical-related product s (220). Indeed,
Italy undei Mussolini suffered from the 1930s world economic depression;
but the point is that the North-South economic gaP between persisted
during this era.
During the two first decades of the First Republic, the North-South
situation was not much different from the old one. The fact that the North
economically grew faster reflected in the phenomenon of great migration
from the South to the North that culminated during the economic miracle
years from 1953 to 79632 (Allum, 2000: 72; Zamagni, 2000: 49). To make
u bulu.t.ed view, it is worth noting that the Italian government did make
efforts to overcome the South economicbackwardness. Since 7960s,through
special public intervention and the use of the Southern Development Fund
the gov-ernment promoted the dispersion of industrial plants to the South.
By 1970sthis policy seemed to bear fruit when the North-South economic
gap was getting narrower (Allum 2000: 37). However, the world's energy
irisis held back this process. But the dominant perception among the
2 in addition, two other waves of rnigration towards the northem region took place in the 1930s
in the 1970s as well (seeZamagni 2001:49. Sassoon, 1997: 3l-36). The pull factor was the
economic growth concentrated in the North and at the same time poverfy in the South also
became the push factor.
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Northerners 
- 
as previously described 
- 
was that the government failed
to deal with the Southern problem. And some politicians from the North
began to question the benefits of the government policy for the North.
The historical account as described above confirms that the North-
South cleavages exist in Italy. The Northern question the have become
prominent since 1990s basically roots in the Italian political history - just
iike the religious and class cleavages. It has persisted through time, from
the period of Italy's unification, Giolitti and Fascism eras, to the period
of the First Republic. The fact that the North cleavage has been present
suggests that it could potentially be translated into political parties.
Activating the Cleavage
Having acknowledged that the North cleavage objectively exists,
we may say that this cleavage can potentially become a social base for
political parties from which they can dig a relatively stable political
support. As previously noted, it can only happen when this long-time
dormant cleavage is to be activated. The key is that politicians must
activate by selling a campaign program that coincide with the interests
of the people belong to the North cleavage (see Przeworski and Sprague
1986:55-56). Lega Nord is a glaring example. In a public statement that,
for example, one of the Lega Nord's leader, Umberto Bossi, once made an
aopeal bv emnhasizine the need to preserve Lombardy's interest:
"L6mba.dy is irot an idfit who witl pay other people's de6ts. Irombardy is not
eoins io follow Rome passivelv ihto Uant<ruptcv because it has no intention
SacriHcing the rights o'f its citiiens, the sweit <jf its sons, the diligelce qn$
personality of its- people on the altar of Roman misgovemment." (Fassini,
igg8 as quoted byBull and Gilbert 2001: 13).
At other times Bossi stood out as the defender of the whole northern
region saying, "The center and the South contribute only 36 per cent of the
GDP, yet it absorbs 55 per cent of public expenditure. Rome takes far more
thant it gives to the North." (Sassoon,1997:263). The slogan launched by
Lega Nord also draws a sharp dividing line between the North and South:
"Roma ladrona, Ia Lega non perdonfr" (Rome, big thief, the l,eague does not
forgive).
Forza Italia in a similar way has also exploited the North sentiment
in order to secure political support. One of the core campaign themes
launched by Forza Italia is its emphasis on the importance of civil society.
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This idea implies that the overweening role of the national state should
be reduced. At the same time Forza Italia asserts governmental human
resources should come from private sectors. (see, Sani and Segatti, 2001:
I7S). This assertion reminds us to the format of the state as idealizedby
the northerners d.uring the formation of the Italian state in the late 19th
century. This is to say thut Forza Italia skillfully identifies itself as the
carriei of the North's interest. In fact, this party made an alliance with
the other right wing parties (Lega Nord and Allearrza Nazionale) during
the 1994 election. fnir means that Forza Italia also endorsed the idea of
representing the interest of the North as widely campaigned by Lega
Nord.
We have seen so far that the right wing parties - particularly Lega
Nord and Forza Italia 
- 
basically have a strong social base for their political
support. And they have skillfuily crafted their campaigns that match with
the Northern question. Differently put, the right wing parties have been
able to activate a dormant cleavage and to translate potential support into
actual votes. The following table demonstrates that the parties do really
have a social base in the northern region:
Distribution of Valid Votes in the Regional Election of 2000 (provincial
list) Percentage of in Selected R9gto19
*I. Democratici, PPI, Unione dem.per. l'Europas, Rinnov. Italiano-Dini, Fed. Dei
V"rai, SOI, pRi, CDU, CCD, Panirella-Bonirio, Autonomisti, and other smaller
parties. Sonrce: Adnpted from Caciagli and Zuckerman Q001: 232)
At this point, this paper has fulfilled its tasks to answer a set of
qubstionr pos"b in the.introductory section. First, on the question of
why the right wing parties achieved the electoral success, this paper has
demonstraied thaf the key of success lies in the presence of the North
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cleavage. This cleavage has become the social base for the parties and the
cleavage supplies the parties with relatively stable political preference.
Second, on the question of whether or not their electoral success was
merely a reflection protest voting, this paper argues that protest voting
played a role in the initial electoral success. But protest voting could not
sustain as the only explanatory variable for the parties'durability.Shortly,
the presence of the North cleavage to a large extent can explain both the
parties'electoral success and their durability. Finally, the rightwing parties
have proved to be able to activate the North cleavage by capturing the
interests of a large segment of the northerners. This is why the right wing
parties have gained their prominence while the left parties seem to be part
of the Italian past 
- 
at least in the northern regions. Differently put, it is
the course of the Italian political history that opened political opportunity
for the righf partly because party of the left (PSI) was involved in the
corruption and mismanagement during the period of the First Republic.
Conclusion
One major conclusion that can be drawn form this analysis is that
the Italian right wing parties are more than a protest party. Thuy do not
come from nowhere. Instead, they stand on a strong social base that has
made them able to survive more than here elections. It is worth noting
here that this paper does not make a claim that the right wing parties
have developed ihemselves to become cleavage parties. It might be too
far if we jump to a conclusion that the Italian right wing parties (Lega
Nord, Forza Italia and Alleattza Nazionale) have developed a partisan
base that connects the North cleavage to the parties as the former major
parties did. As characterized by many scholars,Forza Italia, for example,
is very weak in terms of organizational reach. It relied heavily on the mass
media (especially television) to appeal voters and depended heavily on
Berlusconi personality and leadership (Morlino 13I-32).In this way,Forza
Italia is not comparable to the old parties (PSI, DC, and PCI) in terms of its
ability to penetrate the society. It is simply not a mass-based party.
Another caveat should be added. This paper deliberately did not
take into account other possible factors that affect the electoral success of
the right wing parties. Institutional, cultural, and international factors can
all be influential to shape the political fate of the right wing parties. Also,
the dynamics of coalition and conflicts between the right wing parties is
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ignored; and at the same time the multiplicity of issues that divide the
iotiticat positions of the right wing parties are downplayed- In short, the
u.g.t..,"ttt developed in tf,it puper serves as a complement to the other
existing explanations. **'F**
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